Obama's Strategy

I’ve been struggling with how to feel about the current administration’s revamping of the United States Middle East policy. When I voted for Obama I did so with nagging reservations about his stances on many major issues both domestically and internationally and thus far I give him an ‘I’, as in incomplete. I’m still waiting to see how things begin to shake out in the next six months. Basically I’m giving him a full year before I start being to judgmental. To that effect I solicited a more knowledgeable friend for his take on the game Obama’s playing in the Middle East. He sent me the below response from a friend of his. It’s a succinct, well thought out and eloquent response, which I’m very grateful for. Enjoy:

Obama’s approach to the Middle East is best understood and analyzed as a function of three primary theaters: (1) Iraq; (2) the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and (3) Iran. There is little to say about Iraq other than that a “responsible drawdown” and withdrawal of U.S. forces, while premature in terms of Iraq’s overall autonomous capabilities, is nevertheless necessary due to the prohibitive cost and paradoxical challenges of pursuing Iraqi stability while simultaneously guaranteeing that—through our presence—Iraqis will never possess the incentive to take meaningfully take matters into their own hands. The withdrawal is thus a gamble, but the only realistic option, especially given the ongoing strain on our military.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is more complicated. While Obama is a popular president with significant political capital, he faces a hopelessly (and perhaps irreconcilably) split Palestinian polity—divided both politically and territoriality between the Hamas-run Gaza Strip and the Fatah-run West Bank—on the one hand, and an obstinate, right-of-center Israeli government on the other. The problem with Netanyahu’s government is not merely the rhetorical challenges presented by Lieberman or Netanyahu’s own politics, but the very nature of his coalition; cobbled together from smaller, rightwing parties, the political stability of Netanyahu’s government is dependent upon strong opposition to several processes which are necessary for the achievement of a final status agreement with Palestinians, including mainly the West Bank settlements, and Jerusalem.

The Palestinians and Israelis themselves therefore seem completely incapable of progress on their own, and the situation requires a heavy degree of outside pressure. Obama’s strategy, as exemplified by the Cairo speech, seems to be to reach out to regional Arab states as a way of building consensus among those actors that a peaceful resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is truly in everyone’s best interest, a realization which has probably been building over the last decade, with the rise of Political Islam, which threatens the control of secular Arab governments.

By publically leaning on Israel, Obama is seeking to present himself (in contrast to Bush) as a credible mediator; of course, this strategy plays differently to his Israeli audience, which finds Obama’s handling of the situation thus far biased and unfair. But I believe that it is intentionally so—not because Obama is necessarily anti-Israel or pro-Palestinian, but because of a realist recognition that Arab assistance in the peace process is a political nonstarter so long as the United States remains viewed as uncritically pro-Israel. The results of this strategy remain to be seen.

As for Iran, the Obama administration’s strategy is likely currently in total flux. The aftermath of the June 12th elections and the reaction of the Iranian regime to popular protests have changed the equation, and certainly make negotiations with Iran far more difficult—both politically and conceptually. The strategy will have to be reformulated, and we will see in the coming months how the United States, along with other world powers address this issue. An Israeli strike remains unlikely.